Build It, But They Won't Come

(Unless Forced To)

Why Governments Must Rig the System in the Jet Age

1   The Original Pickering Airport Plan

On March 2, 1972, the federal government announced that it was expropriating 18,600 acres of farmland and two settlements, in Markham, Uxbridge, and Pickering Townships, to build Toronto's "second major international airport."[1]

During the spring of 1972, the federal Department of Transport released details of the project. These revealed a plan for a new Toronto region airport that would be even larger than Malton (now Toronto Pearson), within a multi-airport system:

- The federal Cabinet had approved expropriation of the Pickering site based on the Department of Transport's advice that Malton's 3-runway airport "could not be expanded." The department's air passenger forecasts showed that Malton would be "full" within a decade.

- The original plan for Pickering called for as many as 6 runways[2] and an official opening date of 1979 or earlier.

- The Pickering site's area was 4 times larger than Malton's.

- The department called the planned facility "Toronto International Airport II," to emphasize its size and importance. (However, the media and the public fixed on the shorter "Pickering airport" label; the official name never took hold.)

To summarize: *A major international facility* **built on** *a greenfield site* **were the two chief characteristics of the planned Pickering airport.**

2   Has a Similar Plan Ever Succeeded?

In the GTAA's *Needs Assessment Study: Pickering Lands, Final Report* (March 2010), an entire chapter was devoted to studying cities in the United States and Canada with multi-airport systems. The systems were "comprised of multiple airports offering significant levels of commercial air carrier service" (ch. 7, p. 1), and the answer to our question was hiding in plain sight in the report's Table 7-1: Airport System Summary Information (reproduced in **Appendix A**).

The answer: In the jet age, there has *never* **been a** *naturally* **successful major international airport built on a "greenfield" site, either in Canada or in the United States, as part of a multi-airport system. The last naturally successful "greenfield" airport dates back to WWII.**

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1. Slinger, John. "Terminal open by 1979: City of 200,000 to rise near airport in Pickering" (March 3, 1972). Globe *and Mail*, p. 1.

2. "[Pickering] was to have been the site of Toronto's second international airport ... and it was going to be a dandy. There would be six runways; well, maybe not six, maybe four. ....", *Paper Juggernaut: Big Government Gone Mad*, Walter Stewart, McClelland and Stewart, 1979, p. 9.

The critical word in that answer is *naturally*. Because, while there have indeed been several successful major international airports built on "greenfield" sites in multi-airport systems in the United States since 1942, their success was achieved only through direct government interference in the local multi-airport marketplace.

Fig. 1 Government intervention to ensure success of "greenfield" airports

City	Older/area airports, year opened	"Greenfield" major int'l airport added	"Greenfield" airport opens	Government intervention	"Greenfield" airport successful
San Francisco	Oakland, 1927 San Jose, 1965	San Francisco	1927	**No**	Yes
Los Angeles	Ontario, 1923 Hope, 1930 Wayne, 1939 Palmdale, 1940 Long Beach, 1941	Los Angeles	1928	**No**	Yes
Toronto	Toronto Island (Billy Bishop), 1939 Hamilton, 1940 Waterloo, 1950	Pearson (orig. Malton)	1939	**No**	Yes
Chicago	Midway, 1923	O'Hare	1942	**No**	Yes
New York	Teterboro, 1919 Newark, 1928 LaGuardia, 1929 Stewart, 1939	JFK (orig. Idlewild)	1942	**Yes**	Yes
Washington	Reagan (orig. National), 1941 Baltimore, 1950	Dulles	1962	**Yes**	Yes
Houston	Hobby, 1927	George Bush	1969	**Yes**	Yes
Dallas	Love Field, 1917 Greater Southwest, 1953	Dallas/Fort Worth	1973	**Yes**	Yes
Montréal	Trudeau (orig. Dorval), 1941	Mirabel	1975	**Yes**	No
Denver	Stapleton, 1929	Denver	1995	**Yes**	Yes

Note: Most data extracted from Table 7-1 of the *Needs Assessment Study Report*

How and When Government Intervened to Ensure New-Airport Success

1. Chicago O'Hare (opened 1942)

Government didn't intervene for O'Hare but the airport is included in this list because intervention may still be in the cards.

Chicago's original airport, Midway, is now tightly surrounded by city, with no room for expansion. In 2002, when O'Hare's expansion was determined to be too expensive and disruptive, land began to be acquired at Peotone, about 60 miles south of Chicago, for a third airport (South Suburban) when O'Hare went "full." This expropriation (the land had been identified as a future airport site in the 1990s) was carried out in the face of strong local protest and vociferous airline opposition. Major U.S. air carriers had long been publicly opposed to construction of a Peotone reliever, even stating in 1998 that

> the bulk of our passengers in Chicago are clustered around O'Hare, not in the south suburbs. Moreover, you can't have two major airports (O'Hare and Peotone) so close together. The only way an airport would work down here is if you would close O'Hare, and that's not going to happen.[3]

O'Hare has now reached its runways' capacity limits, and the concerns of air carriers and the public over adding a new airport seem to have been heard: a new facility is *not* being built at Peotone. Instead, O'Hare has begun expanding from 7 to 8 runways within its existing site,[4] in the latest phase of an ambitious, costly, multi-year configuration involving the closure of 3 runways, the construction of 4 new ones, and the lengthening of 2 others. The work is about half done.[5] The Peotone airport project, meanwhile, was recently declared "dead" by local officials.[6] The land remains farmland. But as with Pickering, the dead just appear to die. In October, 2016, Illinois' Department of Transport was reported as having once again submitted plans for Peotone to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for approval – despite O'Hare's mega-expansion and despite the fact that the airlines and public don't want Peotone.[7] If Peotone is ever built, government might have to intervene in Chicago's airport system to prop up an echoing new facility by banning certain traffic from O'Hare.

2. New York JFK (Idlewild) (opened 1942)

JFK became successful and remains New York's major international airport thanks to the imposition on its predecessor, LaGuardia, of a perimeter rule prohibiting the older airport from handling virtually any nonstop flights to or from points beyond a 1,500-mile limit. At a later date, the FAA further limited LaGuardia, placing restrictions on the number of flights it could handle and on the types of planes that could use the airport.[8] Newark airport, being part of the New York metropolitan area, handles overseas flights too, but this is hardly surprising: New York has over three times the population of the GTA.

3. "Airlines Rip Backers of Peotone Airport Site – Exec Calls Proposal A 'Laughingstock'": http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-02-23/news/9802230043_1_american-airlines-major-commercial-facility-major-airport

4. https://www.faa.gov/airports/airport_development/omp/media/Chapter1_page51.pdf

5. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-ICK7JHW-WJA/Vq1B7qltJgI/AAAAAAAABX4g/C3cbpORX23I/s1600/KathrynsReport.jpg

6. "Listen to local officials who say Illiana, third airport are dead": http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/daily-southtown/opinion/ct-sta-slowik-third-airport-st-0316-20160315-story.html

7. http://rockrivertimes.com/2016/11/10/proposed-peotone-airport-still-circling/

8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LaGuardia_Airport

3. Washington Dulles (opened 1962)

To drive air traffic to the new Dulles airport, which was raising white-elephant fears almost from the start, a 1,250-mile nonstop flight rule was imposed on the main Washington airport, National (now Reagan), effectively limiting the older airport to short-haul flights. Responding to pressure from air travellers, who preferred the convenience of downtown Reagan to the hour-long trek to and from Dulles, the government has gradually allowed an increasing number of exceptions to the 1,250-mile nonstop flight rule. But this latest Congressional meddling may have overshot its mark: Reagan is growing, as expected, but there is now concern about a business slowdown at Dulles.

4. Houston George Bush (opened 1969)

The government declared Houston's original airport, Hobby, unsuitable for expansion, and recommended that a major international airport be built to replace it.[9] When Houston George Bush opened, Hobby was redesignated as a general aviation/corporate jet airport, and all airlines relocated from Hobby to the new airport, guaranteeing the latter's success. Domestic air passenger service was gradually reintroduced at Hobby. Limited international air service within North America was resumed there only in 2015.

5. Dallas/Fort Worth (opened 1973)

This airport came about as a result of the FAA's refusal to continue funding both a Dallas and a Fort Worth airport. Working to a federal deadline, the cities chose their new airport site on land midway between them. To make the new airport viable as soon as it opened, Fort Worth's Greater Southwest airport was closed. Dallas' Love Field was placed under restrictions, and nearly all the airlines that were using it were pretty much obliged to sign an agreement to relocate operations to Dallas/Fort Worth. Business at Love Field plummeted. But Southwest Airlines, not a signatory to the agreement, stayed at Love Field and, after airline deregulation in 1978, began expanding its service there. In 1979, the federal Wright Amendment was passed to restrict Love Field further while benefitting Dallas/Fort Worth. The Amendment prevented non-stop flights from Love Field except to destinations within Texas and four neighbouring states. Love Field's domestic flight restrictions were very gradually eased, finally ending in 2014. Dallas/Fort Worth is the area's successful major international airport. But to obtain that outcome, it took four decades of government interference in the business of the surviving older airport and of many airlines.

6. Montréal Mirabel (opened 1975)

To ensure Mirabel's success, Transport Canada dictated that Montréal's main airport, Dorval, must relinquish to Mirabel all its international flight business (except to/from the United States), between 1975 and 1997. The plan was to eventually close Dorval. The public, however, didn't want to lose its more conveniently located airport, and this reality, combined with many other problems to do with Mirabel, brought about the newer facility's failure as an air passenger airport. Commercial airline service ended there on October 31, 2004. Mirabel has since been repurposed as an air cargo airport, and part of the site is a flight test facility. In 2015, the once-state-of-the-art passenger terminal was demolished.

7. Denver (opened 1995)

Denver airport did not appear in Table 7-1 of the *Needs Assessment Study* because government action prevented the creation of a multi-airport system for that city. Denver's success was guaranteed from its opening day by the permanent closure of its predecessor, Stapleton. The Stapleton site has since been redeveloped for residential and commercial use.

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9.   https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/epwhe

4   Why Do Governments Intervene?

In the jet age, new airports do not *naturally* grow into financially successful, stand-alone businesses, chiefly because air passengers and airlines are reluctant, for a number of reasons, to use the new facility, and resist doing so.

Canada's Department of Transport knew about this reluctance in 1972. Famous Canadian historian, Donald Creighton, reminded them of it at the time:

> On what basis can two airports, both serving the same area, split the market between them? The airlines are strongly opposed to duplicating their equipment and services at two nearby terminals. The travelling public wants to go where it gets the most comprehensive selection of airline companies and flights.[10]

Mirabel proved him right. There are still air travellers and airlines haunted by their bad experiences with Mirabel, one of Canada's biggest, and certainly best known, federal public-works project failures of the 20th century.

Our country's airlines agree with their Chicago peers. It's not good business for an airline to leave a hub airport, nor do airlines want to split their services between two area airports. In his 2016 report, "Jets & Jobs," Dr Gary Polonsky recorded some of their recent observations:

> [They] **stressed that any decision to build a new airport would need to be *market-driven*, not forcing passengers or staff to be or go where they don't want to** … the role of a potential Pickering airport needed to be defined, with a view to ensuring coordination with **Pearson** which **would remain the international hub for Canada** … **splitting airline operations between airports is expensive and unpopular …**[11]

5   Potential Problems for a Toronto Multi-airport System

5.1   If Pickering were built to be a successful major international airport…

Transport Canada has not retracted its 1972 commitment to the federal Cabinet and the Canadian people to build a new major international airport at Pickering, and one that is larger than Pearson:

- The site being retained for a potential future airport remains nearly twice the size of Pearson's 4,613 acres.

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10. Dr Creighton's essay "The Politics of Pickering" was published in the *Globe and Mail* on October 21, 1972, under the headline "The Grand Outrage of the Grand Old Man."

11. "Jets & Jobs," pp. 33-4.

- The current Pickering Airport Site Zoning Regulations map, published June 7, 2013, specifies a 7-runway capacity. The July 18, 2015, map of proposed revisions to the Pickering Airport Site Zoning Regulations indicates 3 runways, but the layout does not eliminate the possible addition of close parallel runways in future expansions.

As we've seen, in the jet age, to ensure that a "greenfield" airport becomes a successful major international airport, the standard strategy has been to restrict, or even prohibit, commercial air passenger service at the previously dominant airport. There's no evidence that Pickering would break the mould without government intervention. So how would this "fly" in the GTA?

The strategy would mean significantly curtailing Pearson's commercial air passenger service. In short, victimizing Pearson to facilitate Pickering. But a political furor would ensue: the economy of Mississauga and the western GTA would be significantly harmed by Pearson's job losses. The action would be opposed by airlines, freight carriers, west-of-Toronto businesses, and the majority of the GTA's air travelling public. It would be opposed by area MPs, more numerous on the west side of Toronto than on the east side.

And the strategy carries no guarantee of success. It was applied to a considerable degree at Mirabel and famously failed, while harming Dorval into the bargain. The only way to ensure a successful outcome would be to *close* Pearson to commercial airline traffic, an option that is not on the table.

Pearson is Canada's largest and busiest airport and Air Canada's main hub. Its plans are for growth, for becoming a mega-hub airport, Canada's gateway to the world. Pickering, if built, could only aspire to being Pearson's regional/reliever.

5.2   If Pickering were built to support Pearson, Toronto's hub airport…

A decade ago, the GTAA supported the idea of Pickering's role as a regional/reliever airport. In its 2004 *Pickering Airport Draft Plan Report* to Transport Canada, it presented a Pickering plan that would have the airport open by 2012 as a 2-runway general aviation/corporate jet facility and gradually grow into a 3-runway Pearson reliever in the 2030s.[12] A footprint was protected "for future generations to work with, to plan an airport capable of expansion as demand warrants."[13] So again, there's no doubt that Transport Canada continues to aim at a large airport at Pickering.

The *Draft Plan* foresaw no significant passenger service at Pickering to start with.[14] Nor did the *Needs Assessment Report* of 2010. The report also firmly stated that "purely from an air cargo demand-capacity perspective, a new airport is not required within the planning horizon" (i.e., before at least 2032) and, significantly, that "the vast majority of participants in the air cargo industry would prefer to stay at Pearson and Hamilton given the investment in infrastructure at those airports, and the concentration of freight forwarders at Pearson."[15]

What this means is that, without government intervention, Pickering, even as a regional/reliever, would founder, because it would be competing with underutilized, well-established, and often better-placed area airports for Pearson's spill-over. Intervention on behalf of one airport would deprive and harm others –

12. *Pickering Airport Draft Plan Report*, Greater Toronto Airports Authority, November 2004, p. 4:29.

13. Ibid., p. 1:2.

14. Ibid., p. 2:13.

15. *Needs Assessment Study: Pickering Lands, Final Report*, Greater Toronto Airports Authority, March 2010, ch. 10, p. 22.

the very opposite of market-driven policy. In fact, no detailed analysis has ever been made public to show how this regional/reliever Pickering airport could be a financial success.

The GTAA has recently shown it's no longer counting on the construction of a Pickering airport. In September, 2015, it released a white paper that delivered a dire warning: "By 2043 the regional air travel volume is expected to reach a staggering 90 million passengers annually, or more … With no plan in place to increase the region's air travel capacity there will be a demand/capacity gap of around 24 million passengers by 2043."[16] Ever since, the GTAA has been actively pursuing the report's proposed solution, working with existing southern Ontario airports on ways to accommodate the anticipated passenger growth. As for Pickering airport, the report doesn't even mention it, other than as a "site" on a map.

6   When Will Pearson Reach Capacity?

Good question. Here's what the public has been told:

- The *Pickering Airport Draft Plan Report* (2004) quoted Pearson's capacity as **50 million passengers a year**.

- Pearson's Master Plan, 2007, gave the airport's "ultimate capacity" as **54 million passengers**.

- The *Needs Assessment Study Report: Pickering Lands* (2010) quoted Pearson's capacity as **54 million passengers *on 6 runways***.

- The GTAA's 2015 white paper implied that the airport's capacity was **65 million passengers a year**, and that "regional air travel demand will start to approach a capacity milestone by the mid-2030s, even after contemplated expansions at Toronto Pearson…"[17] It went on to say that "a conservative estimate of air travel demand over the next two decades by the GTAA puts **Toronto Pearson Airport at roughly 65 million passengers per year by the mid-2030s**."[18]

Since then, **the GTAA has continued to hike Pearson's estimated air passenger capacity**:

- At the end of 2015, Pearson's capacity was said to be **65-75 million by 2030**.[19]

- By the end of 2016, Pearson had released yet another white paper, stating that "with the potential to accommodate **80 million passengers by 2035** and an increasing international reach, Toronto Pearson has the opportunity to become a mega hub."[20]

It should be noted that, on February 7, 2016, at an Ajax-Pickering Board of Trade (APBOT) breakfast, two GTAA consultants (accompanied by the GTAA's CEO), while not putting a number on Pearson's

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16. "Toronto Pearson: Growth, Connectivity, Capacity: The future of a key regional asset," September 2015. Urban Strategies Inc. and Toronto Pearson, p. 3.

17. Ibid., p. 1.

18. Ibid., p. 3.

19. http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/transportation/2015/12/14/ever-busier-pearson-airport-charting-path-to-fly-even-higher.html

20. "Toronto Pearson International Airport, Growing Canada with a Mega Hub Airport", December 2016. Toronto Pearson, p. 6.

upper limits, told the audience that Pearson's capacity would be "maxed out" by 2032, and in fact that's when "southwestern Ontario, reaches capacity." They weren't above using scare tactics. stating that:

> when we say capacity, that means that we don't have the capacity in the airport system to handle all the passengers that would like to use the system.[21]

But buried among the facts and figures presented that morning was the admission (our italics and bracketed insertions) that

> on the assumptions here, we planned the growth at Pearson in terms of adding new terminal capacity *but not adding a new east-west runway*, [i.e., the approved 6th runway] so just increased terminal size at Pearson. *We have not included in the chart planned expansion for the airports of southwestern Ontario* [although those airports have expansion plans]. [...] Pearson grows its terminal, the other airports don't yet expand, and in 2032, we hit a max., where we can no longer cover all the demands in southwestern Ontario.[22]

If you parse those statements carefully, you find that 2032 won't be a "maxed out" year after all.

Land Over Landings' Research Paper 7, "What Is the True Capacity of an Airport?", establishes that an **airport site's capacity limitation is** *not* air passenger numbers but **the capacity of its runways to safely handle aircraft takeoff/landing movements**. A *Globe and Mail* reporter, writing about the GTAA's 2015 white paper, astutely pointed out that Pearson's current 5 runways won't reach capacity until the mid-2030s at the earliest:

> Pearson projected in 2008 that it would need to add a sixth runway, but it appears that may not be necessary for at least another two decades, she [Eileen Waechter, GTAA Director of Airport Planning] said, because airlines are using larger planes and have increased the number of seats they have on all sizes of planes ...[23]

Adding Pearson's 6th runway won't be the only card left to play to raise the airport's capacity limit. The general public is not being told about how implementation of current technology will increase an airport's ability to safely handle more aircraft movements on its existing runways. Improved navigation technologies, known as Required Navigational Performance (RNP), are being implemented around the world, including at Canadian and U.S. airports. These technologies determine aircraft positions more precisely, allowing safe, reduced separation between aircraft. RNP benefits the airlines by reducing an aircraft's flight time and fuel consumption. It also increases airport efficiency, safely enabling more aircraft takeoff/landing movements per hour.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) calls its implementation of RNP technologies "NextGen." **The FAA quotes Richard Anderson, CEO of Delta Airlines, as saying that the "NextGen" is "the equivalent of adding a new runway in Atlanta."** [24] Atlanta, like Pearson, has 5 runways. Upgrading to RNP technologies could increase Pearson's capacity further. Airlines will start to demand it to reduce their costs. By adding the on-site facilities necessary to accommodate air passenger growth, and improved ground transportation to and from the airport, it is conceivable that Pearson could come close to accommodating that "staggering 90 million passengers annually" by 2043.

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21. Land Over Landings' transcript of meeting.

22. Ibid.

23. Keenan, Greg. "Southern Ontario airport capacity to be challenged by surging passenger traffic: report." *Globe and Mail*, October 8, 2015. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/southern-ontario-airports-must-integrate-to-meet-demand-report/article26710785/

24. https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/works/

7   **Conclusions**

Several existing, underutilized airports can already lay claim to being suitable candidates for designation as a Pearson regional/reliever: London, Hamilton, Waterloo, and even Peterborough, whose new 7,000-foot runway was designed to accommodate transcontinental jet service. The most likely candidates are Hamilton and Waterloo, being closest to the far-more-populous western side of the GTA. But even these well-located airports struggle to attract and keep sufficient airline service and maintain financial viability. It's inevitable, then, that they would fiercely compete for any commercial air-passenger jet business driven from Pearson. **Pickering's future as a stand-alone, financially successful, regional/reliever airport could only occur if the government rigged the system exclusively in Pickering's favour.**

It's increasingly unlikely that government would undertake the marketplace interference necessary to drive sufficient air traffic from Pearson (or elsewhere) to make Pickering viable. And meanwhile, the GTAA-led, 12-airport coalition is at work determining how they will jointly accommodate air traffic growth in the south-central Ontario region over the next several decades.

It would be interesting to know the assumptions underlying those discussions. Would they be the ones described to APBOT in February, 2016, by the GTAA's consultants, who projected unparallelled population growth, a massive increase in airport users, a consequent growth of airport services, and therefore essential airport expansions? The consultants said: "Growth is coming. There are pretty serious numbers. We're looking at doubling the number of passengers and increasing the population of the GTA ... a rate of growth that's faster than any other global city." One consultant went on to explain that

> Passenger demand drives GDP growth. That 17 billion of GDP would finance a lot of capital, a lot of infrastructure build. It's very important here to see the close link between passenger demand and GDP growth, so that when we're looking at expansions of the airport system we now have some maths around what's the opportunity cost of not having those passengers inside our system?[25]

Did he just say: let's get even more passengers through so they can help fund airport expansions?! This is more than troubling. Building or expanding an airport isn't the same as building a new Tim Horton's or Walmart. Those outlets attract business on their own; as we've seen, airports are another matter, at very high risk of failing without the kind of government intervention that carries complex, far-reaching consequences. New airports and airport expansions are never all-benefit and no-risk. They are public policy issues, with major transportation and infrastructure implications. They have widespread political, social, and financial repercussions. A new airport at Pickering would have consequences far beyond Pickering and Pearson. The public needs to know the benefits and risks of such ideas.

Instead, boards of trade are being fed a one-sided and misleading vision of "good news" growth – unfettered, endless, essential if the GTA is to retain its position in the world, essential to its future prosperity – which can only be accommodated by adding airport capacity. There is no acknowledgment that forecasts may be overstated, or that other factors, such as climate change, might disrupt or overturn projections. What, for instance, will happen to current air traffic forecasts if interest rates or fuel prices start climbing, or if trade globalization begins to falter? These "ifs" are not far-fetched. Such risks must be factored into any discussion or plan of airport-system expansion. The stakes are just too high to gamble with.

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25. Land Over Landings' transcript of meeting.

Appendix A: From the GTAA's *Needs Assessment Study: Pickering Lands, Final Report* (March 2010), ch. 7, p. 3

Table 7-1 Airport System Summary Information

Multiple Airport System	Population		Airport	Year Built/ Opened	E/D Passengers (2006)[1]	Aircraft Movements (2006)[1]	Cargo (2006)[1]	Owner	Operator
	City	MSA/CMA							
Chicago	2,875,585	8,488,880	O'Hare International Airport (ORD)	1942	77,028,134	958,643	1,558,235	City of Chicago	City Department of Aviation
			Midway International Airport (MDW)	1923	18,680,663	298,548	14,728	City of Chicago	City Department of Aviation
			Airport System Total		95,708,797	1,257,191	1,572,963		
Dallas	1,205,084	3,808,649	Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW)	1973	60,226,138	699,773	757,856	Cities of Dallas, Fort Worth	Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Board
			Dallas Love Field (DAL)	1917	6,874,717	248,805		City of Dallas	City Department of Aviation
			Airport System Total		67,100,855	948,578	757,856		
Houston	2,009,669	4,494,637	George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH)	1969	42,550,432	602,672	409,122	City of Houston	Houston Airport System (reports to City)
			William P. Hobby Airport (HOU)	1927	8,549,289	234,709	8,474	City of Houston	Houston Airport System (reports to City)
			Airport System Total		51,099,721	837,381	417,596		
Los Angeles	3,819,413	9,857,690	Los Angeles International Airport (LAX)	1928	61,041,066	656,842	1,907,497	Los Angeles World Airports	Los Angeles World Airports
			John Wayne Airport (SNA)	1939	9,613,540	347,194	21,684	Orange County	Orange County
			LA/Ontario International Airport (ONT)	1923	7,049,904	136,261	493,952	Los Angeles World Airports	Los Angeles World Airports
			Bob Hope Airport (BUR)	1930	5,689,291	131,214	52,292	City of Burbank	Glendale-Pasedena Airport Authority
			Long Beach Municipal Airport (LGB)	1941	2,758,362	369,738	45,527	City of Long Beach	City of Long Beach
			Palmdale Regional Airport (PMD)	1940			-	Los Angeles World Airports	Los Angeles World Airports
			Airport System Total		86,152,163	1,641,249	2,520,952		
Montréal	1,620,693	3,635,571	Pierre Elliott Trudeau International Airport (YUL)	1941	11,431,751	213,468	153,346	Transport Canada	Aeroports de Montreal
			Mirabel Airport (YMX)	1975		21,925	121,238	Transport Canada	Aeroports de Montreal
			Airport System Total		11,431,751	235,393	274,584		
New York	8,388,048	11,533,637	John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK)	1942	43,762,282	378,389	1,636,357	City of New York	Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
			Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR)	1928	36,724,167	444,374	974,961	City of Newark	Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
			La Guardia Airport (LGA)	1929	26,571,146	399,827	17,882	City of New York	Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
			Stewart International Airport (SWF)	1939		83,133	16,451	State of New York	Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
			Teterboro Airport (TEB)	1919		187,840	-	Port Authority of NY & NJ	Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
			Airport System Total		107,057,595	1,493,563	2,645,651		
San Francisco	751,908	1,697,375	San Francisco International Airport (SFO)	1927	33,574,807	359,201	594,857	City of San Francisco	Airport Director (reports to a mayor-appointed Airport Commission)
			Oakland International Airport (OAK)	1927	14,692,875	330,418	668,217	Port of Oakland	Port of Oakland
			Mineta San Jose International Airport (SJC)	1965	10,708,065	188,458	91,648	City of San Jose	San Jose City Council
			Airport System Total		58,975,747	878,077	1,354,722		
Washington DC	557,620	5,227,288	Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD)	1962	22,813,067	379,571	350,826	US Federal Gov	Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
			Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI)	1950	21,184,208	305,630	123,954	MAA	Maryland Aviation Administration
			Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA)	1941	18,545,557	276,419	3,612	US Federal Gov	Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
			Airport System Total		62,542,832	961,620	478,392		
Toronto	2,503,281	5,113,149	Toronto Pearson International Airport (YYZ)	1939	30,972,577	417,921	505,000	Transport Canada	Greater Toronto Airports Authority
			John C. Munro International Airport (YHM)	1940	644,524	70,794	84,500	City of Hamilton	Tradeport International Corporation
			Region of Waterloo International Airport (YKF)	1950	91,690	104,242	-		
			Toronto City Centre Airport (YTZ)	1939	261,233	90,199	-	Toronto Port Authority	Toronto Port Authority
			Airport System Total		31,970,024	683,156	589,500		

Footnote:

1. Data for the Toronto airports is for 2007. All others represent 2006 data from ACI.